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Black Public Administration University of New Mexico Whether or not US security is at stake in
the Panama Canal, US military and political leaders have long been convinced that is the case.
Thus, the indictment of Panama's ruling general, Manuel Antonio Noriega, and the airing of his
many categories of criminal activity pose a serious challenge to the Reagan administration. It can no
longer openly back Noriega, in fact, it has felt obliged to engage in a public display of opposition.
Nevertheless, given the stories that the drug-dealing general has yet to tell, he could hardly be
left alive and with nothing left to lose in his relations with the US. Nor would precedent suggest
that the US is apt to leave the resolution of the current legitimacy crisis and the future direction
of Panamanian politics to the discretion of the Panamanians. For public consumption at home,
Noriega is predictably attributing his current altercation with Uncle Sam to US intentions to hang
on to the canal well past the year 2000. In that, he is not entirely off the mark; there are indeed
powerful forces in Washington who would exploit the Noriega affair to that end. But from the
perspective of Washington, the threats and opportunities presented by the Noriega affair are far
more complex and multidimensional. The affair taps into virtually every concern and ambition
that enjoys a forum in US politics. In general, Panamanian leaders have alternately responded to
and contributed to an explosive climate of public opposition to United States operations in the
Canal Zone. They have had to walk the tightrope of taking a strong enough stand on the issue to
maintain popular support while keeping popular manifestations of frustration within controllable
limits, and without appearing so militant as to alarm the North Americans. The current challenge
to Noriega is of the same order. It may be that given the allegations about his role in the murder of
Torrijos and other prominent Panamanians and about the dimensions of his racketeering, only the
appearance of an orchestrated US campaign to drive him from power could save his position. The
primary factors conditioning Panama's national development and its external relations have always
been its size and strategic location and its economic dependence upon the canal and international
trade. And the North American presence has been its major source of frustration. Provisions of
the 1902 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, under which the United States was granted the Canal Zone
"in perpetuity," made Panama a virtual protectorate of the United States until 1936. Relations
with the United States in general, and the status of the canal zone in particular, have continued
to be the overriding concerns of foreign policymakers, and have strongly influenced domestic
political contexts as well as relations with all other countries. Despite the negotiation of additional
treaties in 1936 and 1955 and several lesser concessions by the United States, various aspects of the
relationship continued to generate resentment among Panamanians. Aside from the larger issue of
jurisdiction over the zone, which bisected the territory of the Republic, Panamanians complained
that they had not received their fair share of the receipts from the canal, that commissaries in the
zone had damaged commercial interests in the Republic, that Panamanian workers in the zone
had been discriminated against in economic and social matters, and that the large-scale presence
of the United States military in the zone and in bases outside the zone cast a long shadow over
national sovereignty. After serious rioting in 1964, which indicated the intensity of nationalistic
aspirations concerning the status of the zone, the United States agreed to enter into negotiations
for a new treaty. Meanwhile, studies relating to the construction of a new canal were undertaken.
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In 1971, after a four-year interlude, negotiations were renewed, but it was not until 1977 that two
new treaties, one providing for Panamanian assumption of control over the Canal in the year
2000 and the other for a permanent joint guarantee of the Canal's neutrality, were signed. The
treaties were ratified by a Panamanian plebiscite in October 1977 and by the United States Senate
in March and April 1978. The treaties launched a new era in Panamanian national life and in USPanamanian relations. But it was too much to hope that it would be an era free of serious discord.
Panamanians have not failed to note that the United States, in the past, has been less than religious
about living up to treaty commitments. Ironically, or, one might say, cynically, the United States had
"justified" its military intervention on behalf of the Panamanian secessionists in 1903 by citing its
1846 treaty with Colombia, whereby the US had guaranteed Colombia sovereignty on the Isthmus.
Furthermore, the new treaties were fraught with ambiguities and contradictions and in several
respects fell short of satisfying Panamanian expectations. Even though the extensive US military
presence has been highly offensive to Panamanians, the US promised no reduction before the
year 2000. It promised only to "endeavor to maintain its armed forces in the Republic of Panama
in normal times at a level not in excess of that of the Armed Forces of the United States of America
in the territory of the former Canal Zone immediately prior to the entry into force of this treaty."
And the provision of the permanent neutrality treaty that after the year 2000 "only the Republic of
Panama shall operate the Canal and maintain military forces, defense sites and military installations
within its national territory," is contradicted by the US Senate's reservation allowing for bilateral
agreements on the stationing of US military forces in Panama after that date. The neutrality treaty is
self-contradictory in that it guarantees transit to vessels of all nations on terms of "entire equality"
but, as subsequently interpreted by President Carter and Panama's General Omar Torrijos and
amended by the US Senate, guarantees that US vessels may, if necessary, go "to the head of the
line." And a reservation is attached by the US Senate to the Canal Treaty nullifies that treaty's
provisions for bilateral accord on the construction of a sea level canal. Despite prohibition against
intervention in the internal affairs of Panama, the meaning of the U.S. guarantee of the Canal's
neutrality remains unclear. In fact, the US Senate's so-called DeConcini reservation, legitimating
US military intervention in the event of interference with the operation of the Canal, smacks of the
protectorate status from which Panama supposedly emerged in 1936. Although the compromise
wording in the reservation to the Canal Treaty, to the effect that the US right to keep the Canal
open shall not be "interpreted" as a right to intervene in Panama's domestic affairs, was accepted
by Torrijos, it has been less than reassuring to many Panamanians. At any rate, power disparities
remain, and many Latin American states can attest to the fact that when the United States believes
that its interests are threatened, treaty commitments to nonintervention are easily overlooked. To
US strategists, the importance of Panama and its political leadership has been compounded in the
1980s by the crisis in Central America. Thus, even as the country's diplomats participated in the socalled Contadora initiatives for pacific settlement, Noriega's National Guard was relied upon to train
the contras. Even the CIA's investment of millions per year over a ten-year period, however, was not
enough to buy Noriega. As it turned out, Noriega was not for sale, only for rent, and the CIA would
not necessarily be able to outbid other contenders, like Colombia's Medellin drug cartel. Given what
must now be seen in the US as the unreliability of Panamanian leadership, Panamanian fears that
the US will not live up to its treaty commitments cannot be lightly discounted.
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